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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
that "the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant
to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation,
or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities
for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the
accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression. The
decisive considerations are too variable, too much distinctions of degree,
too dependent in the last analysis upon a common sense estimate of fair-
ness or of facilities of proof, to be crowded into a formula. One can do
no more than adumbrate them; sharper definition must await the specific
case as it arises." 3 1 It can at least be argued that there is little rational
connection between the evidence admitted in the Richardson case of de-
fendant's bad reputation and his guilt of the particular crime; and that
the use of such evidence imposed as much of an unnecesary 32 and undue
hardship upon the defendant as if the court had treated it as a statutory
presumption. Moreover, even if the Court were to decide that the partic-
ular use of reputation evidence in the Richardson case did not violate the
due process clause, such evidence coupled with questionable corroborating
testimony by an accomplice may have rendered the proceedings invalid.
ROBERT T. JENSEN
Private Communication with Grand Juries
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed and clarified its
holding that unsolicited communications by private citizens to a grand
jury to inform the jury of crimes that have been committed are unlawful
and contempts of court.1 In an earlier case of People v. Parker,2 exten-
sively commented upon in a recent issue of this Journal,3 defendant had
addressed two letters to the Cook County grand jury charging the pub-
31 Id. at 89-91.
32 Such methods of facilitating prosecution have been criticized as tending to in-
crease laxness on the part of law enforcing agents. Cf. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.
1940) §2251. Particularly is this criticism applicable where, as in the Bichardson
case, the law enforcement agents themselves are permitted to testify to the defend-
ant's bad reputation.
'.People v. Parker, 397 Ill. 305, 74 N. E. (2d) 523 (1947), aff'd., 68 S. Ct.
1082 (1948). In addition to litigation arising out of Parker's two attempts to
communicate with the Cook County grand jury, he has also been adjudged guilty
of contempt in connection with a slander action which he commenced. Purporting
to comply with an order of court entered upon motion of the defendant to the
slander suit, Parker filed on the records of the court various documents charging
the Chicago Tribune and various officials and judges of Illinois with certain crimes.
The facts are set out in detail in the opinion of the Appellate Court affirming the
judgment of contempt, People v. Parker, 328 Ill. App. 46, 65 N. E. (2d) 457 (1946),
aff'd. 396 Ill. 583, 72 N. E. (2d) 848 (1947). The finding of contempt was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 571 (April 5,
1948), in which three justices dissented. The opinions involved issues of constitu-
tional law arising out of Illinois appellate procedure which are beyond the scope of
this note.
It should be noticed that all of the Parker litigation arose out of a conflict be-
tween Parker and the Chicago Tribune. It can be regretted that the important
question of the circumstances under which a private citizen can communicate with
the grand jury should be decided in such an atmosphere.
2 374 Ill. 524, 30 N. E. (2d) 11 (1940), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 560 (1941).
3 Fremon, Private Communications with Grand Jurors (May-June, 1947) 38 J. of
Crim. L. & Criminology 43, which extensively examines the cases and authorities
concerning the history and power of the grand jury.
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]isher of the Chicago Tribune and various public officials with having
connived to steal large sums of money from Cook County in the form of
unpaid taxes and penalties. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
letters, which the court said were "couched in exceedingly vicious and
inflammatory language," were contempts of court. The opinion left
some doubt whether the court intended to hold that any communications
by private citizens to a grand jury are forbidden unless through lawful
channels. Some commentators expressed the hope that the court would
limit its holding to communications which the court considered prompted
by malice, and that the court would not abrogate the common law rule
that a citizen has a right and even a duty to provide the grand jury with
information in his possession concerning crimes which had not been
brought to the jury's attention.4
But recently in a second case involving the same defandant,5 the court
appears to have set the matter at rest. On this second occasion Parker
sent another letter to the grand jury charging the same individuals with
substantially the same offenses as in the first case. Parker purported to
sign the later communication, which was temperately phrased, as an
officer of the Puritan Church and insisted that it had been composed
by the church and mailed in furtherance of church duties. Refusing
to distinguish the first case on the basis of the tempered tone of the
letter involved in the second, the court also rejected Parker's contention
that the communication was sent in the exercise of his constitutional
rights of freedom of religion and freedom of speech. The court held
that the obvious purpose of communicating with the foreman of the
grand jury was to incite the grand jury into action and that hence the
letter fell within the rule "which forbids communicating with the grand
jury, except through recognized lawful channels. "6
Parker then took the case to the United States Supreme Court, where
he argued that in punishing him for communicating with the grand jury
the courts of Illinois had denied him his freedom of speech and of religion
guaranteed to him by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In a per curiam opinion, the Court recently announced that it
had divided four to four on the merits and that, therefore, the judgment
of contempt was affirmed.7 Since no individual opinions were filed, one
4 See comment (1941) 8 U. of Ci. L. Rev. 561, in which the conclusion is reached
that the first Parker case did not change the common law in Illinois. Fremon, op.
cit. supra note 3 at 46, in his discussion of the first Parker case, concluded that there
"the Illinois Supreme Court r~jeeted the contention of the state that any communi-
cation was contemptuous, but upheld a contempt conviction where the communica-
tion on its face showed malice and personal enmity.' " The broad language of that
opinion would not seem to support such a conclusion.
5 People v. Parker, 397 Ill. 305, 74 N. E. (2d) 523 (1947), cited supra note 1, a
per curtam opinion.
6 Id. at 307, 74 N. E. (2d) at 525.
768 S. Ct. 1082 (1948). The brief memorandum opinion said: "Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson is of the opinion that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed
and did not participate in the question as to the disposition of the case on its merits.
With respect to the merits the judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."
It should be noticed that private communications to federal grand jury were
restricted by Mr. Justice Field in 1872 when he instructed a grand jury that its
investigations were to be limited to matters called to its attention by the court or
submitted by the district attorney, or to matters based on its own observations and
knowledge. He seemed to think that private communications were generally actuated
by enmity or malice. 30 Fed. Cas. 992 (1872). For citation of the federal cases
see Fremon, op. cit. supra note 3 at 45.
1948]
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
can only conjecture that four of the justices could not stomach the
thought that a man could be punished simply for communicating with
a governmental agency such as the grand jury. The other justices pre-
sumably believed that the states must be left free to protect their judicial
machinery from interference, and that they could at their discretion
forbid communications with grand juries.8
The Illinois Supreme Court in the two Parker cases has rejected a
distinction, recognized in some jurisdictions, between private communi-
cations which concern matters then pending before the grand jury and
those which are intended to inform the jury of crimes not previously
reported to it. Although communications not made through official
channels about crimes currently being investigated are generally con-
sidered unlawful attempts to interfere with grand jury action, many
courts recognize the right and even the duty of a citizen to bring original
charges directly to the jury. In a proper case the Illinois Supreme
Court might conceivably limit the rule of the Parker cases to communi-
cations by malicious individuals or cranks; but the broad language of
the two opinions leave little hope that it will do so.
It should be noted, however, that communications by public-spirited
groups, such as Chambers of Commerce or local bar associations, intended
to advise grand jurors of their powers and duties do not appear to fall
within the language of either case. Such information in other juris-
dictions has never been construed as tending to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice. Judicial instructions to grand juries are not always
phrased so as to acquaint them with their broad common law power to
investigate crimes free from supervision or control by court or prose-
cutor. The preparation and distribution by private groups of informa-
tion for grand jurors would, therefore, appear to be a desirable check
to a tendency to convert the grand jury into an expensive rubber stamp
for prosecuting attorneys.
PETER A. DmmNN
8 For more extensive treatment of the problem see Fremon, leo. cit. supra note 3.
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